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AN EXAMINATION OF THE THOMISTIC
THEORY OF NATURAL MORAL LAW*
Kai Nielsen
THEORIES OF NATURAL MORAL LAW have deep roots in our culture. They have
emerged again and again in our western tradition, not, however, without im-
portant variations. They are less appealing in times of social and political sta-
bility than in times of social crisis. In times when man turns against man,
voices are always raised to remind us that man by virtue of his very humanity
has certain inalienable rights and certain absolute correlative obligations to his
fellow man. Like Antigone, we appeal to moral laws that transcend an ethno-
centric "closed morality" of social pressure. In our recent history, liberalism, both
theoretically and practically, has faced dilemmas; liberalism has been subjected
to penetrating and varied challenges. Saddled with this situation, some theolo-
gizing political scientists have hoped to find in the classical doctrine of the nat-
ural moral law a "new" and more secure moral foundation for democracy and a
solution to the modem liberal predicament. As incisive a student of the chang-
ing human scene as Walter Lippmann, has in his The Public Philosophy at-
tempted a modem adaptation of the classical natural moral law theory as the
way to wisdom in our social life and politics. By return to a secure foundation
in the classical tradition of natural moral law, we can underwrite democracy
and escape the quandary of "the masterless man" searching--perhaps un-
consciously-for his "soul" or for a point of view for which he can live and
die. A social ethic, firmly grounded in the natural moral law, will supply a
dynamic standard to enable us to root out the modem malaise that says, with
James Joyce, "Ours is an age of exhausted whoredom, groping for its God."
I believe the philosophical and ethical theory operating in these classical
natural moral law theories to be basically mistaken. Therefore, I do not be-
lieve they can serve as adequate theoretical justifications for democracy
or for anything else. Rather than criticize Lippmann explicitly, I will turn
here to Lippmann's mentors, that is to say, I shall turn to the well-
articulated and thoroughly developed theory of natural moral law that
we find in Aquinas and in some contemporary Thomists. In this con-
I should like to thank Professor Warren C. Hamill of St. Anselm's College for his help-
ful criticism of an earlier draft of this essay, though I should not like to suggest that he
would agree with my criticisms of Aquinas.
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nection, I shall pay particular attention to the arguments of Jacques Maritain
and F. C. Copleston.1
It is important to note that I am not contending it is unintelligible to
speak in some vague and unanalyzed sense of a natural good or goods that
men generally incline toward. 2 I am only contending here that the scholastic,
philosophical theory about natural law is in some basic respects unsatisfactory
and, in the last analysis, unintelligible. I neither assert nor deny there are
some basic moral evaluations common to the human animal. I should think
that there are some, but the problem is too amorphous to be settled as yet.
We need first a detailed analysis of what is meant by the terms, 'common
good,' 'pan-human good' or 'basic moral evaluations,' and we need a thor-
ough comparative anthropological investigation of what moral appraisals are
actually made in radically different cultures. To take a stand pro or con,
prior to such investigations, is unreasonable. I shall try here to fairly state
and criticize the Thomistic theory of natural moral law.
I shall do this in the following way. In I, I shall make some remarks
about what has been taken by the Thomists to be the proper setting for an
adequate statement of the natural moral law theory. Then in 11 and III, I
shall turn to the epistemic side of Thomistic ethical theory. In II, I state
and evaluate Maritain's conception of "knowledge through inclination" and
in II1, contrast Thomas' ethical theory with theological voluntarism and
criticize the Thomistic concept of something being self-evident in itself. In
IV, I shall elucidate what Aquinas means by 'natural moral law' and con-
trast it with his other conceptions of law. In V, I shall state and then criti-
cally comment on the primary and secondary precepts of the natural moral
law. In VI, I shall first discuss two standard difficulties with the natural
law theory and then turn to two less frequently voiced, but more radical
criticisms, that - to my mind - take us to the heart of the matter. Finally,
I shall turn in VII and VIII to some puzzles about morality and teleology that
might, in the light of my arguments in VI, prove worrisome.
1. The basic texts involved are ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II, Qq.
90-108; and SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, Book III; Copleston's major treatment occurs in
.F. C. COPLESTON, AQUINAS, ch. V (Baltimore, 1955). For Jacques Maritain's most recent
extended examination, see his MAN AND THE STATE (Chicago, 1951); THE RANGE OF REA-
SON (New York, 1951); and Natural Law and Moral Law, in MORAL PRINCIPLES OF Ac-
TION 62-76 (ed. by R. N. Anshem, New York, 1952). I have also drawn from some
unpublished lectures given by Maritain at the University of Toronto in 1952. For a brief
but excellent summation of Aquinas' view see Clifford G. Kossel, S.J., The Moral View
of Thomas Aquinas, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORALS 11-23 (ed. by V. Ferm, New York, 1956).
2. The Oxford moralist, P. H. Nowell-Smith, makes an analysis of natural good that seems
to me a step in the right direction. P. H. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS 171-82 (Baltimore, 1954).




Aquinas and contemporary Thomists like Maritain and Copleston give
a large place to reason in their Christian ethical theory. They argue that
if man doubts God's revealed Word, he can by the use of his reason
come to know that God exists and that there are certain natural moral laws
carrying obligations. By his reason alone, man can know certain natural
goods. Aquinas' approach here bears the stamp of Aristotle's "commonsen-
sical philosophy of ethics."
Though "metaphysical ethics" is now out of fashion in most quarters,
Aquinas' theory has no plausibility at all apart from his conception of the
nature of the universe.3 In evaluating Aquinas' ethics we must keep con-
stantly in mind his physics and cosmology. As Copleston remarks, Aquinas
"sees the moral life in the general setting of the providential government of
creatures" (p. 212), that is to say, Aquinas, like Aristotle, thinks the uni-
verse is purposive. It has a destiny and a rationale. The universe is not just
some vast machine or conglomeration of atoms swirling in the void. The
end of all activities in nature, says Aquinas, is God. In medieval physics,
it is believed that all natural motions are just so many attempts to reach
the changeless. Sublunar substances seek re-establishment in their proper
places. Celestial motions cannot falter; they return upon themselves in per-
fect circles. Nevertheless, they are still motions. Only God is absolutely mo-
tionless and changeless. All motions and all things try to attain God, the
motionless or changeless Being. We know that knowledge of and union with
God is man's highest good; all other goods are finally instrumental to that
good. But as Sisyphus sticks to his job with his stone, we ineluctably quest
for that highest good. We know God exists, but we contingent, changing
creatures never obtain God or knowledge of His essence in this life. But,
unlike Sisyphus, we mortals have a surcease from striving, for after death
there is a complete apprehension of God in His very essence.
Maritain emphasizes that conceptions of the natural moral law cannot
be secularized, as in Grotius or Paine, without cutting out their very heart.
The natural moral law theory only makes sense in terms of an acceptance of
medieval physics and cosmology. If we give up the view that the universe
is purposive and that all motions are just so many attempts to reach the
changeless, we must give up natural moral law theories. One might say, as
a criticism of the Thomistic doctrine of natural moral law, that since medie-
3. Kossel remarks: "The moral science of Aquinas is deeply rooted in metaphysics and
theology." Kossell, op. cit. supra, note 1 at 12.
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val physics is false then it follows that natural moral law theory must be false.
While agreeing with this criticism, I think it is too short and too easy a way
out to carry complete conviction. Contemporary Thomists would like to say
that somehow the medieval view of cosmology or metaphysics is distinct
from physics, and though the physics is false, the cosmology is still true. This
seems to me just an evasion. If the word 'cosmology' means anything at all,
it seems only to denote bad armchair physics. The so-called disciplines of
cosmology and metaphysics have made no progress in discovering the cate-
gorial features of the world. This is so partly because of the very unsettled
and indefinite signification of the words 'cosmology' and 'metaphysics.' In
such a situation, it seems to me quite unrealistic to think we can use such
disciplines as a basis for anything very substantial. 4 In this connection, it
might be noted, incidentally, that Copleston, in his recent book, Contemporary
Philosophy, is extremely cautious in his claims for metaphysics. 5 He rightly
criticizes many things in contemporary and analytic philosophy, but in the
process, he seems to have been bitten by the empiricists' bug! I shall not,
however, rest my argument on this general blast against speculative philoso-
phy though I should like to remark that my contention does not turn on a
logical positivist rejection of metaphysics as nonsense. There may be, as Peirce
suggests, both good and bad metaphysics and metaphysical methods.
II
Leaving aside all talk about the adequacy or inadequacy of metaphysics,
let us look directly at Aquinas' moral philosophy. Aquinas believed that the
good is somehow the normal. It is found by observation; that is to say, it is
to be discovered by studying man's inclinations and reflecting on them. It is
to be seen by apprehending what life really is. It is important to note, how-
ever, that this is an odd kind of "seeing" or "apprehending." As Maritain
makes perfectly clear, it is a direct, immediate, nonconceptual "knowing
through inclination" or "knowledge through connaturality." 6 And it is im-
portant to remember here that Maritain is not just trying to urge a view of
his own but is also trying to elucidate what Aquinas really meant when he
said we have knowledge of the natural moral law.
4. Sidney Hook's critique of Thomism on this point seems to me essentially correct. See
Sidney Hook, Scientific Knowledge and Philosophical Knowledge, 24 PARTISAN REVIEW
215-34 (1957).
5. See particularly ch. V and XII.
6. See JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RANGE OF REASON, ch. III (New York, 1952). See also
his contribution, Natural Law and Moral Law, in MORAL PRINCIPLES OF ACTION (ed. by
R. N. Anshem, New York, 1952).
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Let us look a bit more carefully at this doctrine, for it is, according to
Maritain, central to the Thomistic theory of natural moral law. Unfortu-
nately, as Maritain also emphasizes, it is an extremely obscure doctrine. This
so-called "knowledge through inclination" seems unlike what we ordinarily
call "knowledge." It seems more like a feeling or an attitude. I am at a loss
here to find an intelligible use for "knowledge," and I am far from sure
that we can see clearly from Maritain's account exactly what it is that he
wishes to say. (Here he could use a few lessons from G. E. Moore.) So in
setting forth this aspect of Maritain's doctrine, I will be forced to use quo-
tations liberally.
We discover first that knowledge through inclination is entirely nonra-
tional and nonconceptual, even though produced in the intellect.7 It is im-
portant, according to Maritain, for two reasons: 1) it "obliges us to realize
in a deeper manner the analogous character of the concept of knowledge"
and 2) it is important because of the role it plays in our knowledge of human
existence. 8 It is obviously not a deductive kind of knowledge, and it is not
knowledge through sense experience or speculative knowledge through "in-
tellectual intuition." 9 Maritain remarks: "the intellect is at play not alone,
but together with affective inclinations and the dispositions of the will, and
is guided and directed by them." 10 It is knowledge expressing the inner
propensities of our being. It may be "incapable of giving account of itself, or
of being translated into words." 11 We find it occurring in mystical experi-
ence and in "poetic knowledge," but the best paradigm for it is in moral
knowledge. For Aquinas, our philosophically unmediated moral experience
is the prime example of knowledge through inclination. In a very puzzling
passage, Maritain remarks of Aquinas:
It is through connaturality that moral consciousness attains a kind of
knowing - inexpressible in words and notions - of the deepest dispo-
sitions - longings, fears, hopes or despairs, primeval loves and options -
involved in the night of the subjectivity. 12
Maritain does not deny that the facts are relevant to moral appraisal, but
he adds that the moral agent must take into account "secret elements of eval-
uation which depend on what he is, and which are known to him through
7. MARITAIN, THE RANGE OF REASON 22 (New York, 1952).
8. Ibid.
9. Id. at 29.
10. Id. at 23 (italics mine).
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 26 (italics mine).
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inclination, through his own actual propensities .... ," 13 Moral judgments
which express the natural moral law are not known through any "conceptual,
discursive, rational exercise of reason." 14 Instead, through inclination we
grasp that what is in line with pervasive human desires and wants is good,
and what conflicts with that is bad. Moral philosophy does not discover the
moral law, though (in some unspecified sense) it critically analyzes and elu-
cidates moral standards.1 5 Objective moral standards (ultimately the natural
moral law) are known immediately through inclination.
In this murky doctrine of "knowledge through inclination" there is (so
far as I can understand it) a good bit that is true as well as a good bit that
is false. I shall first remark on what seems to me true in the theory and then
I shall turn to what I take to be wrong with Maritain's theory.
First, Maritain is right in claiming that the concept of knowledge has
an analogous character, that is to say, the word "knowledge" gets used in
several different but not unrelated ways for several different purposes. My
only question here is whether Maritain has either elucidated one of its many
common uses or clearly stipulated a new use. Secondly, Maritain is also right
(following Aristotle) in regarding moral knowledge as a kind of practical
knowledge and in claiming that moral philosophy cannot by itself supply
standards of moral appraisal. Surely, if a man had never experienced pain,
remorse, deprivation, desire and the like, moral distinctions could have no
meaning for him. A completely unmoved spectator of the actual would and
could make no moral judgments or reflective moral appraisals. Furthermore,
moral appraisals are practical in the sense that they are to guide action and
alter behavior and not just to describe a state of affairs. But this claim has
been clearly explicated from within an essentially empiricist point of view
without any of Maritain's obscure constructions. 16
Let us now consider difficulties in Maritain's conception of "knowledge
through inclination." First, the work of philosophical analysts like Ryle and
Wittgenstein makes it questionable whether one can sensibly speak of a kind
of knowing "inexpressible in words and notions." To call something that
cannot be conceptualized or expressed "knowledge" seems like an early re-
treat into a kind of obscurity that makes philosophical appraisal impossible.
How can we, if we doubt there is really such a kind of knowing, rationally
resolve this doubt? Or, even more basically, what is it that Maritain is claim-
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 23.
15. Id. at 28.
16. Philip Blair Rice has recently developed a renovated ethical naturalism in which this
is one of the cornerstones of his philosophy. See PHILIP B. RICE, ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF
GOOD AND EVIL (New York, 1955); and P. H. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS (Baltimore, 1954).
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ing? It is a truism to say that in philosophical appraisal we must necessarily
deal with what is expressible.
My second critical point about his doctrine of knowledge through inclina-
tion is connected with the last part of my second positive point. In effect,
Maritain sets forth a naturalistic theory at the foundation of natural moral
law: 17 what man strives for is good and what man avoids is bad. But at
the same time he claims that only a supernatural sanction will do for morality
and will avoid the chaos of our time. Yet, on his doctrine of knowledge
through inclination and on his natural moral law theory, the man in moral
perplexity needs only to observe the desires and wishes of his fellow man
and by seeing what they generally seek he will know what is good and what
he ought to do. It is very difficult to see how this doctrine differs very much
from that of Russell (in his Human Society in Ethics and Politics) and
Hume where they claim that reason is and ought to be the slave of the pas-
sions and that the fundamental data for and basis of ethics are the emotions,
passions, and impulses. The Thomistic label "knowledge through inclination"
only serves to label the baby "legitimate" in the eyes of the supernaturalists.
And to call attention to the distinction between jus gentium and jus naturale
is not at all to the point here, for it is claimed that by noting the actual per-
vasive desires and wants of the human animal we can at least dimly come
to know the natural moral law.
III
Maritain, however, would not wish to accept this reduction - there are
other elements in his theory that run counter to that and may provide him
with a way out. For Aquinas and for Maritain good is not simply what God
wills, as the theological voluntarists claim. God's intellect is logically prior to
His will, according to St. Thomas. He wills the good because it is good.
Aquinas' medieval opponents, Scotus and Ockham, hold different views.
Scotus claims that God's will is prior to His intellect. In understanding hu-
man good, we must look to what man wills or strives for. William of Ockham
goes all the way with this theological voluntarism. Something is good simply
because God wills it. Goodness is in the will and not in any order of being
or reality. What is right or wrong morally is not subject to rational proof
as in Aquinas. Many people feel that this voluntarist view leads logically to
moral skepticism.' 8 It can be argued plausibly that on the one hand volun-
17. See, for example, William Frankena, Ethical Naturalism Renovated, 10 THE REVIEW
OF METAPHYSICS 457-73 (1957).
18. See E. W. HALL, MODERN SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES 289 (Princeton, 1956).
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tarism leads to Luther, Kierkegaard, and Barth, and on the other, to Hume's
and Russell's view that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions,
the basic difference being that the former are supernaturalists and the latter
are not. But for Aquinas, as for the Stoics, good is somehow in the very na-
ture of things. The highest goodness is an attribute of God's very essence.
This essence we know only after death. But we know now that God is (as
opposed to knowing what He is); and we apprehend the natural moral law
as the part of the eternal law that God allows us to understand with our rea-
son. Our knowledge of it is not precise, but we genuinely know the unchange-
able and eternal good, though we must remember this is "knowledge through
inclination." This natural knowledge of good and evil is far from clear, but
we do have it; and it is well to remember that this practical knowledge is
claimed to be certain though cognitively unclear knowledge. By this, Aquinas
(as well as Maritain) means that the natural moral law is self-evident in it-
self though it may not be self-evident to us.
We must, however, look into this peculiar claim of self-evidence. The uses
of this word are many and varied. It is tempting to take an empiricist and
pragmatist line and argue that all talk of "self-evidence" is useless or absurd
because "self-evident truths" are tautological and existential statements are
all less than certain. I do not - at least not here - want to make that strong
claim, but only to argue that talk of "self-evidence in itself," as an idea that
corresponds to the idea of the Divine Craftsman, does not make for clarity.
On such a theory, statements can be self-evident in themselves quite apart
from any human knowledge of them. Maritain emphasizes that it is God's
Reason, not man's reason, that is the source of the natural moral law. For
its authority natural moral law depends solely on "Divine Subsisting Reason."
The cardinal error of Grotius and the philosophes (old and new) is to take
natural law to be a "law of human nature" as deciphered by human reason.
To do so is to make the egregious error of substituting human authority for
Divine Authority, human reason for Divine Reason, as the standard for moral
good. Natural moral laws are indeed rationally self-evident, but they are self-
evident to God and not necessarily to man. Even assuming we can make
sense of all this talk, such a conception of self-evidence still does not help us
out at all, for how do we know, as moral agents faced with practical prob-
lems, which of the many moral imperatives are the self-evident laws of God?
The important thing is to have something self-evident to us, or at least some
reliable knowledge of God's natural moral law. With a natural moral theory
we can, supposedly, bypass the appeal to faith made by neo-orthodoxy and
by Christian existentialism. In Thomistic ethics (old and new) we have held
out to us the promise of a rational ethic and rational decision procedure for
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what we ought to do in particular situations; but in reality, since human rea-
son is not adequate to decide what is a natural moral law or what is or is
not self-evident in such a situation, we are no better off with such a theory
than with the severest fideism.
"Natural moral laws are self-evident in themselves" and "Natural moral
laws are known through inclination" are two exceedingly obscure statements
that raise more problems than they solve. The doctrines they express hardly
function as aids to a rational solution of the problems connected with our
knowledge of good and evil.
IV
Now let us see a little more specifically what Aquinas and his contem-
porary followers mean by "natural moral law." Perhaps here we will at least
discover how to start out. The natural moral law is distinct from the laws
of nature in the scientific sense of "law of nature." A law of nature is a
hypothesis. It functions predictively, though there is no need to say this is
all the laws of nature do. But they must at least do this. If something is a
law of nature we must be able to infer from it "If so and so is done, such
and such will happen." Natural moral law, on the other hand, is normative
and at the same time somehow part of the very structure of the universe. It
not only says what is the case, but it says what ought to be the case.
Natural moral law, for Aquinas, is not merely what is on the books. This
he calls positive law. But he argues that even positive law is genuinely law
only when it does not conflict with natural moral law. Law, for Aquinas, is
essentially a normative or a moral notion. He defines a law as "an ordinance
of reason for the common good, promulgated, and emanating from him who
has care of the community." Certain elements should be noted in his defi-
nition. 1) An ordinance is a precept, or a rule, saying so and so must or
should be done. It is meant to guide conduct and not just tell us what has
been done, is being done, and will be done; rather it tells us that something
ought to be done. 2) It is a rational precept, not just a command. Yet it
carries an obligatory or imperative force. 3) It is for the general good or
happiness of the community. It is not just any command, and it is not just
for some partial good. 4) It must come from a legitimate authority. 5) It
must be publicly stated or proclaimed.
There are four basic kinds of law for Aquinas (natural moral law is, of
course, one of these). First, there is the Eternal Law. The Eternal Law is
God's law or blueprint for the universe. It is law governed by Divine Reason.
It emanates from God as Sovereign and is promulgated by Him for the good
of His Creation in several ways. The natural moral law is that part of the
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Eternal Law that man can apprehend with his unaided reason. It is not a
creation of man's reason, but emanates from God's reason. Man's reason is
quite passive with respect to the natural law. Man does not alter it or change
it. Man is not the measure of all things. Rather, God is the measure of all
that is and of all that is good. Mankind can apprehend this good, but he
does not create or alter it, even by his collective decisions. (It is crucial to
recall, as I pointed out in II, the nature of this "apprehension." It consists
in what Maritain called "knowledge through inclination.") This natural
moral law is the second kind of law. Divine Law is that part of the Eternal
Law which God makes known through Divine Revelation and the like. It is
not grasped by man's reason but is given to man as an Eternal Truth of Di-
vine Revelation. The fourth kind of law is the human law. The particular
precepts for the common good devised or fashioned by human reason are
called human laws. These laws are not just given to us but they are the expres-
sion of human reason and decision. Human law, however, while not derived
from natural moral law must be compatible with it. If a human ordinance
conflicts with the natural moral law, it is a perversion of the natural moral
law. One of the natural laws states that man must seek to preserve his own
being. If we had a particular rule that said "All students who flunk from
college must commit suicide," it could not be a human law, for it is incom-
patible with the natural law that "We ought to preserve our lives." A human
law (to use Maritain's example) that is compatible with the natural moral
law is the law that "people must stop at red lights - go at green lights." This
human law is completely conventional and relative. Yet it is 'important that we
have such a convention and that it is compatible with the natural moral law.
We should not forget that all these laws are either moral laws or they are
directives that must be in accordance with moral laws. They are, in their
proper spheres of application, guides for conduct. The natural law, Divine
Law, and Eternal Law are unalterable and eternal. They are basic moral
truths that hold as truths irrespective of any feelings or emotions on our part.
They are binding on our conscience and we have a duty to obey them
whether we have favorable attitudes toward them or not. And the human
animal can know with absolute certainty, according to the Thomists, that
certain natural moral law precepts are true. Our "knowledge" here is not
"discursive knowledge" but that strange, immediate, "nondiscursive knowl-
edge" Maritain calls "knowledge through inclination."
When we read Aquinas himself, and do not reflect on the sense of "knowl-
edge" relevant here, we are easily led to believe that a claim is being made
that, in some plain sense of "knowledge," we have certain knowledge of some
eternal moral truths. But, as I shall try to show in V and VI, if we take
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"knowledge" in any of its ordinary senses it becomes exceedingly doubtful if
we have any such knowledge of eternal moral truths. Faced with these diffi-
culties it is natural to try to construe "knowledge" in a different way, as
"knowledge through inclination," but then, as I have indicated, we end up
by using the mark (token, sign-vehicle) "knowledge" in a very different way
from the way we normally use it, while still keeping all the honorific features
of "knowledge." We have, in short, made a persuasive definition. And when
we actually keep in mind what is counting as "knowing moral laws" here,
have we really a more objective claim about the foundations of morality than
we have in Hume or Russell? Indeed we have a claim that sounds more ob-
jective than Hume's or Russell's, but when we consider the special way we
"know" these laws (and this is our sole evidence for them) is it really any
more objective than these "subjective views" that Thomists so frequently de-
plore?
V
Let us now consider the actual precepts of the natural moral law. "Good
is to be done and gone after, and evil is to be avoided" is the primary natural
moral law from which all others are derived, and it is the first principle of
practical reason.19 Aquinas and his contemporary followers insist that all the
other natural laws are based on this vacuous first principle of natural moral
law. This, of course, is a very weak base indeed. For, unless we assign some
denotation to the word "good," as used above, this first principle of the nat-
ural moral law would be completely compatible with the most extreme kind
of relativism. But from the first principle of the natural moral law we cannot
determine what the denotata or criteria of application of "good" will be. All
we can conclude from this primary principle is that if something is good we
have to seek it. It does not tell us what to seek. 20 (Is Aquinas' statement
here really anything more than a bit of linguistic information, disguised be-
cause it is stated in the material mode? Is Aquinas, here, really saying any-
thing more than "If we call something 'good' then we must also say that it
is something that is to be sought, everything else being equal"? But this in-
forms us about our linguistic behavior; it hardly gives us the foundation of
an objective rational ethic that will save us from the "dark night of subjec-
tivity.")
Our knowledge of the other natural moral laws is much less certain. We
know them (as Maritain most emphatically argues) immediately and non-
19. Practical reason is reason that is concerned with what is to be done. See John Ladd,
Reason and Practice, in THE RETURN TO REASON (ed. by John Wild, New York, 1951).
20. COPLESTON, AQUINAS 214-5 (Baltimore, 1955).
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conceptually by natural inclination. They are the ends we necessarily seek
in virtue of our very humanity. We might list the ones Aquinas mentions,
stating them clearly as normatives, so as to bring out their moral force.
1. Life ought to be preserved.
2. Man ought to propagate his kind.
3. Children ought to be educated.
4. Men ought to know the truth about God.
5. Man ought to live in society.
6. Ignorance ought to be avoided.
7. Offense ought not to be given unnecessarily.
These are all supposedly based, in some manner, on man's natural inclina-
tions. It is claimed they are based on human nature. However, according
to Aquinas, not all our inclinations are natural inclinations, for some can be
"corrupted by vicious habits," and again the natural knowledge of good in
them (people with vicious habits) is "darkened by passions and habits of sin."
Aquinas is contending that there are some cross-cultural or pan-human char-
acteristics that we might use in constructing a definition of "human nature."
Like Plato, Aquinas is claiming that man is distinguished from the other ani-
mals by his ability to reason. If man examines his natural inclinations, he
will discover that there are certain unalterable pan-human natural moral laws.
Copleston states Aquinas' argument here in the following manner: "For al-
though man cannot read off, as it were, eternal law in God's Mind, he can
discern the fundamental tendencies and needs of his nature, and by reflecting
on them he can come to know the natural moral law." (p. 213) Copleston
continues: "Every man possesses also the light of reason, whereby he can
reflect on these fundamental inclinations of his nature and promulgate to
himself the natural moral law ..... " (p. 213) Purely natural man is not left
in ignorance of the eternal law which is the ultimate rule of all conduct. The
natural law part of the eternal law is not simply a Divine Fiat. Rather, we
moral agents recognize its inherent rationally binding force. Though the first
principle of natural law only tells us that good is to be done and evil is to be
avoided, we give concrete content or non-zero denotation to our concept of
good and evil "by examining the fundamental natural tendencies or inclina-
tions of man." (p. 215) By examining man's nature and natural inclinations
one can discern the good for man in the natural order.
Now, St. Thomas does distinguish between primary and secondary pre-
cepts of the natural moral law. The secondary precepts are not relative. But
they do have only a limited contextual application, that is, they apply only
to certain classes of acts. As Copleston remarks, what Aquinas means in say-
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ing that they can be changed is that such natural moral laws are altered
when the circumstances of the act may be such that it no longer falls into
the class of actions prohibited by the precept. Copleston uses the following
example: "We can say in general that if someone entrusts his property to us
for safekeeping and asks for it back, we ought to return it. No sensible man
would say that if someone entrusts us with a knife or a revolver and asks for
it back when he is in a state of homicidal mania, we are obliged to return it."
(p. 219) Copleston then generalizes: "In its general form, however, the pre-
cept remains valid. We can say with truth that Aquinas believed in a set of
unalterable moral precepts." (p. 219)
Maritain, though he makes a great show of wishing to square Aquinas'
theory with the facts of moral relativity, does not seem to go beyond this
above position in any significant manner. For Maritain there are certain
fundamental "dynamic schemes" of natural moral law that are unalterable
and are universal. In particular contexts they are subject to an "indeterminate
expression." In fact, the same natural moral law can have different and
distinct "indeterminate expressions," although they all must be compatible
with the more general rule. The general rule is not changed. Unfortunately,
the only examples Maritain gives us of culturally relative moral rules are rules
of human law or positive law. However, no one questions their relativity or
conventionality; what we want to know is what he would say about the actual
and anthropologically confirmed exceptions to all seven of Aquinas' natural
moral laws listed above. (Since this could conceivably be read as an admis-
sion on my part that we can derive an "ought" from an "is," it is more pre-
cise - though more cumbersome - to say: "Aquinas' claim that natural
moral laws are expressions of the natural inclinations of all men conflicts with
the anthropological claim that these are not always and everywhere expres-
sions of natural inclinations.") No doubt he would say such inclinations,
when they occur, are perverted or primitive. But this begs the question, for
it is only by at least an implicit reference to a moral standard that we can
determine which rules are "perverted," "primitive," or "corrupt." The natural
moral law theorist, however, is supposedly building a normative ethic on man's
actual natural inclinations, rather than on the inclinations of certain men
called "good or non-perverted men." If the natural moral law theorist is to
be consistent, he cannot simply proclaim a standard of moral appraisal and
then say that all those who do not act in accordance with it are perverted or
evil. Instead, the standard is supposed to come somehow from the very feel-
ings and inclinations of all men.
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VI
The above are only some of the puzzles engendered by the Thomistic the-
ory. As clear as Aquinas' kind of theory may seem the first time around, it
becomes far more difficult to comprehend after a closer look. Its taxonomic
structure hides fundamental confusions, though on Aquinas' behalf it must
be said that they were confusions which might naturally arise in his cultural
context.
In pointing up these difficulties, I shall first turn to two standard difficul-
ties that have been traditional stumbling blocks for students of natural moral
law theories. I do not think these are the most basic difficulties, but I do
think these standard difficulties are genuine and need looking into. I doubt
that they can be answered satisfactorily from within the Thomistic position
of natural moral law. I shall examine them first and then turn to what I
regard to be the two more philosophically interesting and more basic difficul-
ties in the natural moral law theory.
The first standard difficulty emerges when we compare the natural moral
law theory with some of the things now being said in social psychology. It is
frequently said that from the point of view of science, there is no such thing
as an essential human nature which makes a man a man. The concept of
human nature is a rather vague cultural concept; it is not a scientific one.2 1
While I think this criticism is surely debatable, it does raise a problem for the
natural moral law theory since it is clear that the statement, "there is an es-
sential human nature," is not the obvious, self-evidently true statement
Aquinas and his contemporary followers take it to be.
The second standard criticism is a stronger one. It appeals to the facts
of cultural relativity. If we go to actual cultures and study them, we find that
all of the natural moral laws listed above by Aquinas are broken somewhere
by some people. If it is answered, "Well, most cultures obey the above rules,"
two replies can be made.
First, it can be said that the reply in itself assumes that what most people
find natural and better, is natural and better. To assume this, however, is to
presuppose the value of a naive kind of democracy; we determine what is
good by counting noses or by a Gallup Poll. Moral issues become vote issues.
Aquinas, of course, would not wish to say they are "vote issues." Moreover,
21. OTTO KLINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (New York, 1940). On the other hand, A. H.
Maslow and, Weston LaBarre, along with others, have spoken in a supposedly scientific sense
of "a human nature." See A. H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (New York,
1954), and WESTON LABARRE, THE HUMAN ANIMAL (Chicago, 1954).
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why must we accept this "democratic" standard as our ultimate standard?
If we say that people simply do accept it, we not only make a statement that
is anthropologically false, but we also go in a circle. We use our democratic
standard to establish our democratic standard. Secondly, it is the case that
for the natural moral laws which are fairly concrete, there is not this majority
agreement. If we turn to the more general natural moral laws, we find that
they are so vague that they hide all sorts of differences that both parties would
regard as crucial. As anthropologists, like Ralph Linton, have pointed out,
all cultures have a concept of murder. But if we try to give the concept of
murder some specific content which would cover its use in all cultures, we
run into difficulty. While all cultures agree that murder is wrong, this is com-
pletely compatible with the Eskimos' killing members of their family if they
do not feel they can make it through the winter; or with infanticide in Poly-
nesia and Greece; or with the old Scandinavian habit of clubbing one's older
ancestors to death so that they may go to Valhalla. But for these people this
killing is not murder which is by implicit definition wrong. Just what will
count as murder in the given culture varies radically. To say that all cultures
have a concept of murder tends to obscure basic radical moral differences. To
suggest that these are just indeterminate expressions of the basic moral law
blurs a crucial way in which our judgments of good and evil are relative. 22
There are two more basic difficulties with Thomistic natural moral law
theory that I would like to consider now. First, even if it is the case (contrary
to what was said above) that there is basic cross-cultural universal acceptance
of certain fundamental moral beliefs and/or attitudes, it would not follow
that the Thomistic natural moral law ethic had been established. This agree-
ment could be explained at least as adequately by a theological voluntarism,
the kind of meta-ethic offered by Russell and Hume, or by a Deweyian kind
of naturalism. Russell, for example, would not talk of an apprehension of
natural moral law emanating from God. He could explain the same facts by
saying that those common moral ideals are expressions of commonly held at-
titudes or commonly felt emotions. They express the common decisions we
men make in virtue of our common interests and similar make-up. Recalling
that Aquinas and Maritain must invoke the strange doctrine of "knowledge
through inclination," it might well be argued that Russell's kind of theory is
to be preferred because it is simpler. Applying Ockham's razor, we might
naturally remark that Aquinas' "hypothesis" is one we can well dispense with.
22. This point has been made very forcibly both for morals and for art criticism by
George Boas. See George Boas, Cultural Relativism and Standards, in VISION AND ACTION
112-132 (ed. by Sidney Ratner, Rutgers, 1953).
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The same point can be put differently. Because we have (if we have) a
common human nature and in accordance with it make certain common
moral appraisals, it does not follow that there is a natural moral law in the
Thomist's sense. Even if it is true "that all men share some very vague ideas
about the good for man, precisely because they are men who possess certain
natural tendencies and inclinations in common," this does not serve as a proof
that these shared ethical ideals are God-given rather than man-made. It does
not even serve to make such a belief plausible.2 3 One can accept some pan-
human agreement about what man's good is without being committed to
Aquinas' moral philosophy. As a matter of fact, Erich Fromm makes a simi-
lar argument from a naturalistic and neo-Freudian point of view. 2 4
It must be added that this form of "natural moral law" based on univer-
sally shared attitudes is not enough for Aquinas, for it does not establish that
they are self-evident, unchanging moral laws. Thomists need a stronger basis
than the unity of human nature to establish their natural moral law theory.
If there is no unity or common human nature, the Thomists are clearly wrong;
but if there is a unity or common nature to the human animal, it does not
follow that the Thomists are right.
I suggest, finally, that the whole theory rests on the confusion between
what ought to be and what is. As Hume made us realize, the statement, "Man
ought not to steal," is quite different from the statement, "Man does steal." 25
Men steal when they ought not. Sentences with an "ought" in them belong
to a different logical type than sentences with an "is" in them. From fac-
tual statements alone, including statements of fact about human nature, we
cannot deduce or derive any "ought" statement whatsoever. Values and facts
are distinct, and Aquinas and his followers are not clear about this distinction,
precisely because they looked upon nature as purposive, as having some kind
of moral end in itself. This conception of a purposive nature is not only false
but it also serves to obfuscate the basic distinction between facts and values
that is so essential if we are to understand the nature of moral argument and
decision.26
23. See in this context A. I. Melden and W. K. Frankena's contributions to the symposium
The Concept of Universal Human Rights, in Science, Language and Human Rights, 1 THE
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 167-189 (1952).
24. ERICH FROMM, MAN FOR HIMSELF (New York, 1947).
25. Hume's celebrated passage occurs in Book III, Part I, Section 1 of his A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE.
26. In a brilliant and readable interpretation of the history of ideas, Professor E. W. Hall
has indicated how value elements have been gradually taken out of science and how in
moral reflection we have become progressively clearer about the distinction between "ought"
statements and "is" statements. He also indicates how this raises philosophical problems
about the validation of moral and evaluative statements. I might add that I am indebted
to Professor Hall for a general kind of framework in which much of my argument develops.
See E. W. HALL, MODERN SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES (Princeton, 1956).
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VII
Now it may be felt that the last two sentences in VI are sweeping and
wholly unjustified. Where have I established that nature is not purposive and
where have I shown that there are no "moral facts" in a purposive nature?
The basic issue, it may be felt, is simply passed over.
I do not believe this to be true; that is to say, I do not believe that my
case against Aquinas' conception of the natural moral law depends on my
rejection of Aquinas' metaphysics or cosmology. Indeed his and Aristotle's
conception of a purposive nature seems to me at best false and at worst un-
intelligible, but my argument against the natural moral law theory does not
turn on that belief.
It is possible, however, both to make strong arguments against this meta-
physical view and to show that even if these Thomistic metaphysical claims
were true, the essential puzzle about the "is" and the "ought" would remain.
As Brdhier, Koyr6, and others have pointed out, with the arrival of New-
tonian physics and Cartesian philosophy there disappeared from the scientific
outlook all consideration of purpose and value. 27 An experimental psycholo-
gist like Tolman or a biologist may speak of "purposive behavior," but in
Aquinas or Aristotle "purposive" and "purpose" have a very different mean-
ing. To ask "What is Jones' purpose?" is to ask about Jones' motives or in-
tentions (or their behavioral correlations). Now it may be the case that the
distinctively philosophical parts of Descartes are a great mistake, but it will
hardly be claimed that Newtonian mechanics is a mistake, though even here
we must in retrospect distinguish between Newton's physics and the quasi-
theological 'and metaphysical conceptions he shares with Henry More and
Raphson. "A new and fruitful scientific conception," Toulmin remarks, "is
often hatched from an egg of a very different sort, and for some time frag-
ments of its original shell may (so to say) adhere to its plumage." 28 Galileo
may well have been a Platonist, but we can accept Galileo's contributions to
physics without embracing his Platonism, just as we might accept Berkeley's
theory of knowledge without assenting to his views about the value of tar
water; Newton, in later editions of his Principia, urged certain orthodox theo-
logical views, but Newton's physical theory is logically independent of his
metaphysical and theological beliefs. No physicist today would dream of ar-
guing that Aristotelian dynamics ought to replace modem physical theory.
Aristotelian physical theory, qua physical theory, is only of historical interest.
27. E. BRiHIER, 2 HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE, fasC. 1, 95 (Paris, 1929) and A. Koyr6,
Galileo and Plato, 4 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 400 (1943).
28. Stephen Toulmin, 67 PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 572 (1958).
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And modem physical theory, as Hall has argued convincingly in his Modern
Science and Human Values, does not treat nature as good or bad. Nature is
not regarded as purposive, and values are not taken to be some very special
and mysterious facts of nature.
I am perfectly well aware that Thomists would claim that such statements
as "Nature is Purposive" and "There is a Necessary Being or an all-good God"
are metaphysical statements and they are supported in a different way from
scientific ones. But I do not believe (as I said in I) that this metaphysical
position has been made intelligible, much less established as true. The basic
difficulties about purpose or design in nature seem to me to go back at least
to Hume and Kant; and I agree (and I believe most non-Scholastic philoso-
phers would agree) with Broad's verdict: "I have seen nothing in the writings
of those who have tried to rehabilitate the argument which effectively rebuts
their [Hume's and Kant's] adverse verdict." 29 It is true that certain defen-
sive moves have been made against Kant and Hume, though it seems to me
that Hepburn, Anderson, O'Connor, Smart, Nagel, Watts, and Edwards have
recently made decisive arguments against these Thomistic metaphysical
claims.30
I can only briefly indicate one line of argument against claiming that there
is (in the relevant sense) purpose in nature. Suppose we grant that in the
parts of the universe we have observed there is truly a marvelous adaptation
of means to ends. From the movements in our solar system to the return of
the homing pigeon and the pollination mechanisms of plants, things proceed
in an amazingly orderly way. But we cannot conclude from this that the uni-
verse has in the appropriate sense either a purpose or a Designer. (It could
not, of course, fail to have some design in the sense of having some struc-
ture.) 31 Even if it is the case that all processes directed by intelligent crea-
tures involve adaptation of means to ends, this does not entail that all adapta-
tion of means to ends is the product of intelligence. What reason have we to
believe that those marvelous adaptations, which are not independently known
to be deliberately designed, have a design and designer or a purpose? How
could we test whether the human eye, the solar system, or ants were so de-
29. C. D. BROAD, RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH 190 (New York,
1953).
30. RONALD HEPBURN, CHRISTIANITY AND PARADOX, ch. 9 and 10 (London, 1958); John
Anderson, Design, 13 AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 241-256 (1935); D. J. 0-
CONNOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 115-126 (New York,
1957); J. C. C. Smart, The Existence of God, in NEw ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL THE-
OLOGY 28-46 (ed. by A. Flew and A. Macintyre); ERNEST NAGEL, SOVEREIGN REASON
17-35 (Glencoe, Illinois, 1954); G. S. Watts, The Thomistic Proofs of Theism, 35 Aus-
TRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 30-46 (1957); Paul Edwards, The Cosmological Ar-
gument, in RATIONALIST ANNUAL 63-77 (1959).
31. LEIBNIZ, DISCOURSE OF METAPHYSICS.
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signed? What would count as a failure here and what would count as a suc-
cessful test? I do not believe there is or can be a test here. If someone claims
he intuits it, others can and will, with equal legitimacy, claim they do not in-
tuit it. The very meaning of "test" will then become otiose at this juncture.
To say we can legitimately use an analogical argument at this point also
gives rise to insuperable difficulties. The human eye may be like a beautifully
balanced machine or a work of art in certain respects, but it is like a vegetable
or rock in others. Why should we pick one analogy rather than another? If
we say because one more adequately illustrates one claim rather than another,
then we can say: But what independent reason have you to believe that one
claim - the design claim - is the correct claim? We must then leave anal-
ogy or make another analogy, to which the same objection could be made.
And there seems to be no good reason why the design claim should be ac-
cepted as the correct claim. Furthermore, what does it mean to say, "The
universe has a purpose," taking "the universe" either collectively or distribu-
tively? Presumably, if "the universe" is taken distributively, "the purpose of
the universe" is equivalent to the sum of all the individual purposes. But how
do we sum them? What does this look like? And even if we can sum them,
do we not then supposedly have some overall purpose? What would it be like
for the universe to fail to have a purpose? What would have to happen or
not have to happen in order for us to recognize or fail to recognize that it is
true or even in any degree probable that the universe has a purpose? If, in an
attempt to avoid the above difficulties, "the universe" is taken collectively,
then to discover purpose in the processes in the universe would not at all prove
the universe as a whole has purpose. In either event, if "purpose" is being
used analogously to "purpose" in "My purpose is to take the island" or in
"Jet fighters have a purpose," then our uses of "purpose" must have a mini-
mum of one distinctive property in common. But what is this property here?
And if no common property is signified by "purpose," then "purpose" is surely
being used equivocally. 32
These arguments are not new and they are not at all exhaustive of all
the moves that can be made by both sides. They are of necessity put with ex-
ceeding brevity; if I were to expand these arguments I would merely be go-
ing over what seem to me well-worn though decisive arguments that are es-
sentially outgrowths of Hume's and Kant's arguments, though this is not to
say that they have not been tailored to meet attempted rebuttals of Hume
and Kant.




This short argument and "appeal to authority" will no doubt seem un-
convincing to some, but to try to say why metaphysical explanations of this
type are unintelligible would involve another essay, if I were to do justice to
the question. But for the sake of this discussion I will grant what I believe
to be contrary to fact, namely, that "Necessary Being" and "final cause" have
an intelligible use. Let us also assume for the sake of the discussion that sen-
tences like "Nature is purposive," "Man and nature have a final end," and
"Men were created to worship God" are true. My crucial point is: Even if
these sentences really can be used to make genuine statements that are in fact
true, no normative or moral statements can be derived from them.
Philosophers who deny that we can logically derive or base a moral claim
on a metaphysical position will say, as William Dennes does:
A system of metaphysics, if it were known to be the truth or the prob-
able truth about the order of entities that constitute the universe, would
of course be superbly instructive. But there is one thing it could not en-
able us to do logically or intelligibly, and that is to determine from what
really is what really ought to be: to derive from judgments of fact, judg-
ments of value. It could only be by taking the symbol "good" to mean
precisely what it meant by "real," and nothing more than is meant
by "real," that we could say that metaphysics, as a theoretic
discipline, determines or demonstrates the nature of value. But then
our statement, "what is metaphysically real, and only that, is good,"
would mean precisely what is meant by either one or other of the empty
truisms: "Whatever is metaphysically real, and only that, is metaphysically
real," or "whatever is good, and only that, is good." 33
33. William Dennes, Knowledge and Values, in SYMBOLS AND VALUES: AN INITIAL STUDY
606 (ed. by Lyman Bryson, New York, 1954). Father Gallagher has replied to Dennes on
this point but I do not believe he obviates the basic difficulty advanced by Dennes about
deriving a moral statement from a metaphysical statement. Gallagher says, with respect
to the quotation from Dennes given in the text: ". . . a Scholastic would say that every
actually existing thing (that which is real - a res) is good. Even the devil, insofar as he
exists according to the creatural nature God gave him, is good." But the "is" in Galla-
gher's two sentences is not the "is" of identity but the "is" of predication. We can deny
these two statements themselves without self-contradiction; and the last one is clearly a
moral judgment, and the other would be if it were not a bit of indirect discourse. ("Every
actually existing thing is good" is a moral utterance.) To say "Evil, as such, is a privation
and that reality, as such, is good" is to make another moral judgment and not to indicate
how we could set up a metaphysic as the basis or foundation of our moral norms, even if
we can understand (as I do not) what "privation" as "a deflection from his [the Devil's]
original reality, in the direction of nothingness" means. Gallagher is right in saying that
if we accept his moral judgments quoted above as leading moral principles or as normative
defining principles of natural moral law (functioning like the ground rules of chess) then
"'good' can mean precisely what is meant by 'real' "; but Dennes' point and my point is
that in ordinary moral discourse there is no such rule of language and that to make one
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Those who think they can discover what they ought to do from a dis-
covery about "ultimate nature of reality" are tacitly assuming that what is
metaphysically real or "ultimately real" ought to be done or ought to be.
But it is not self-contradictory or even logically odd to say, "X is an ultimate
reality whose nonexistence is inconceivable, but X ought not to be." What
is ultimately real could be evil or it could be quite neutral. There is no rule
of language which indicates an identity of meaning between what is real and
what is good or obligatory. To make such a rule by linguistic fiat and to
claim that such a linguistic fiat ought to be accepted because it gives us a
clearer, more adequate foundation for morals is itself an expression of a value
judgment; and if such a value judgment is made, we must for the sake of
clarity give up the idea that we can derive a moral statement from purely
metaphysical statements and/or metaphysical and empirical statements alone.
That many plain men infer "X is obligatory" from "God wills X, .... X is
in accord with our essential human nature," "X is of the true nature of Be-
ing" and the like, indicates they have tacitly, and perhaps even unconsciously
'(as in a Peirceian acritical inference) assumed "What God wills is obligatory,"
"What is in accord with our essential human nature is good," etc. But here
these hidden premises are themselves moral judgments; the "is" in the above
sentences is not the "is" of identity, and all these statements may be denied
without self-contradiction.
Someone might still claim that I have not yet really met the Thomist or
Aristotelian case. I have assumed a "metaphysical system" or a set of cate-
gories in which fact (including "metaphysical facts") and value are distinct,
but, it might be urged, the Thomistic-Aristotelian system is denying just that,
for some facts and values at least. When it is claimed that nature is purposive,
there is just this conflation of fact and value. I find this claim obscure al-
most to the point of unintelligibility. It is the obfuscation I was complaining
about at the end of VI. There seems to be no intelligible job for these words
here. We cannot do the usual things with them and we do not know what
new things to do except that in some exceedingly obscure way they indicate
that some claim is being made about a more secure foundation for our mo-
rality.
But even if we can intelligibly indicate how the fact-value or evaluative-
descriptive dichotomy does not apply to a statement like "Nature is purposive"
and even if we can show that these "metaphysical realities" are at one and
is in itself to make a value judgment and not to derive moral statements from metaphysical
statements about reality. See Eugene Gallagher, Comments, in SYMBOLS AND VALUES: AN
INITIAL STUDY 615 (ed. Lyman Bryson et al., New York, 1954).
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the same time facts and values, I still do not see how we can derive ordinary
moral or evaluative conclusions from them.
I must explain my meaning here. Moral questions are practical questions.
They occur when questions arise about what is to be done or whether what
was done in the past was the thing to have done. Most paradigmatically,
moral statements are used to guide conduct. 34
We have a clear case of moral reasoning in Thucydides, The Peloponne-
sian War. ( 1.68 ff.) Sparta's allies come to Sparta to discuss the difficulties with
Athens over Potidaea and Corcyra and to decide whether to break up the
Delian confederacy and fight Athens. The question is clearly a question about
what to do. Their interest in what was the case was limited to discovering
those facts which would help them decide how to act. The Corinthians ad-
vised the Spartans: ". . . choose the right course, and endeavor not to let
Peloponnese under your supremacy degenerate from the prestige that it en-
joyed under that of your ancestors." Some Athenians, who happened to have
been in Sparta, countered by bidding the Spartans "not to dissolve the treaty,
or break your oaths, but to have our differences settled by arbitration accord-
ing to our agreement." In weighing the considerations the majority of Spar-
tans were for war, but their old king, Archidamus, urged peace. He warned
them of their inferiority in ships and of Athens' invulnerability and advised
them to "have a care that we do not bring deep disgrace and deep perplexity
upon Peloponnese." He finally urged the Spartans to prepare for war but
not to initiate aggression. But the Ephor Sthenelaidas (a politically astute
rabble-rousing moralist) countered this and exhorted the Spartans to "Vote
... for war, as the honor of Sparta demands, and neither allow the further
aggrandizement of Athens, nor betray our allies to ruin, but with the gods
let us advance against the aggressors." The Spartans considered these con-
tentions and finally with their allies decided on war. The point here is not
to deny that reasoning went on and that factual considerations were involved
but to point out that all of this was instrumental to arriving at a decision.
Moral problems are problems of choice, and moral reasoning is practical
reasoning about how we should act. Even when we say "The Spartans were
clearly wrong in declaring war" we do not make a purely theoretical state-
ment. Rather we are saying (in effect) that the Spartans ought to have acted
in a certain fashion and we imply that if we had been similarly placed we
would have heeded Archidamus and not declared war. Moral questions are,
necessarily, questions concerning what to do. This is the basic sense in which
34. P. H. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS 11-22, 95-104 (Baltimore, 1954); Kai Nielsen, The
Functions of Moral Discourse, 7 PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 236-248 (1957); and Speak-
ing of Morals, 2 THE CENTENNIAL REVIEW 414-44 (1958).
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a moral judgment is prescriptive, directive, or normative.3 5 We are only in-
terested in what is the case to the extent that knowing what is the case is
instrumental in helping us decide what to do.
With these remarks in mind, it should not be hard to see that no moral
or evaluative statements follow from these so-called "fact-value statements"
or from "fact-value statements" together with some plain empirical state-
ments. If I, as a moral agent, discover that, in some peculiar way, the "fact-
value" "The Universe is purposive," is true and that I, as a being in the uni-
verse, have a purpose or an end, it still does not follow that I have ipso facto
resolved any moral perplexity by noting how it is that I behave. The dis-
-covery that "teleological explanations" rather than "nonteleological explana-
tions" best explain how I behave does not entail any moral conclusion.
Suppose my moral perplexity is to discover, in Kierkegaard's phrase, "How
I am to live and die"; that is to say, to find out "the purpose of my existence."
Now, by putting it as "What is the purpose of my existence?" I make it sound
as if I were asking a question of the same logical type as "What is the pur-
pose of my doorbell?" - a question that can admit of a clear factual answer.
But though these questions have a grammatical similarity they have very dif-
ferent uses in human discourse. As Ayer has well said:
... what is being sought by those who demand to know the mean-
ing of life is not an explanation of the facts of their existence, but justi-
fication. Consequently a theory that informs them merely that the course
of events is so arranged as to lead inevitably to a certain end does nothing
to meet their need. For the end in question will not be one that they them-
selves have chosen.3 6
My teleological discoveries will not in and of themselves resolve my problem
of choice. They tell me how (in what way) I am living but they do not tell
me how I am to live and die. "X has such and such end" does not entail
"Do X." When a perplexed person asks: "What is the meaning of life?" he
is almost always asking a practical question. He is trying to decide what he
is to do, and he is only interested in knowing what is the case to the degree
that a certain understanding is essential for any action. It is an answer to
this practical question that his "soul longs after, as the African desert thirsts
for water." 37 But no general description of the world, no causal explanation
- teleological or otherwise - entails an expression of a decision; and the
35. R. M. Hare, Universalisability, ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS 295-312 (1954-55).
36. A. J. Ayer, The Claims of Philosophy, 7 POLEMIc 24 (1947).
37. Soren Kierkegaard, in A KIERKEGAARD ANTHOLOGY 4-5 (ed. by Robert Bretall, Prince-
ton, 1951).
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language of purpose, as used in moral discourse (though not necessarily in
philosophical interpretations or morality), is a bit of practical discourse in
which the key expressions function to express decisions, intentions and the like.
They describe as well, but shorn of this expressive or performatory use the
utterances are without normative or prescriptive import.
This same general point can be made in another way. When "Life has a
purpose" is taken as a physical or metaphysical explanation or description of
human behavior and not as an expression of an attitude or of an intention
to act in a deliberate, responsible, self-conscious manner, no moral decision
or resolution to a practical problem is entailed by the discovery that I am
"purposing" or moving to my natural end. If my behaving teleologically is
just something that happens to me by virtue of my being a human being, then
it cannot also function prescriptively. And this tautology has a point because
it marks a distinction in the uses of language.
Since taking a moral position necessarily involves the making of a deci-
sion, I (as a moral agent) still will have to decide and resolve to seek this end
that I notice human beings in fact seek. I must make, by a moral decision,
this purpose or end (including my purpose or end, so metaphysically defined)
my purpose or end. But this is something I must, as a mere matter of the
logic of the situation, choose or decide to do. I cannot just infer it, observe
it, or grasp it by some "intellectual intuition of being." I may see or notice
purpose in the metaphysical sense; but until I have, by my own free resolu-
tion, decided I should act on this information, I have not arrived at any
moral conclusions.
I cannot derive (1) "This is my purpose" or "This is my goal" taken as
expressions of decisions from (2) "This is my purpose" or "This is my goal"
taken as a metaphysical statement of some odd "value-fact." But since it is
very easy to confuse the metaphysical statement (2) with the moral pro-
nouncement (1), we tend to think that if (2) is true we have answered our
practical question about what I am to do and how I am to live and die. Since
the words "purpose" and "end" get redefined in (2) they can now be used
so that purpose could exist even if no people were making decisions or reso-
lutions and the like. On the metaphysical interpretation, "The purpose of
my life is. . ." is treated very much like "My life expectancy is. . ." But in
ordinary discourse "The purpose of my life is. . ." is used primarily not to
state a fact but to announce a policy. To ask "What is the purpose of my
existence?" is to ask "What ought I to do?" This is a practical question about
what to do and does not involve us in any metaphysics at ali.
When we think we can derive moral conclusions from the metaphysical
statement that "Human life, and therefore my life, has a certain purpose,"
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we transfer the ordinary moral meaning of "purpose" onto the metaphysical
statement, making the metaphysical statement into (among other things) an
expression of a decision. The metaphysical statement in effect redefines "pur-
pose" but the redefinition is leaky; the old use sneaks back in and gives the
analysis far greater plausibility than it in fact has.3s But the metaphysical
statement is not meant to be such a practical utterance, and "purpose" on the
metaphysical use will not bear such a burden.
It may be replied, "But it really will, and metaphysical statements have
their practical uses too. That is the small grain of truth in the contention that
'metaphysics is disguised poetry."' But then it must also be admitted that, so
used, the metaphysical statement (2) can no longer be understood as pre-
supposing that it makes sense to speak of the purpose of human beings apart
from what attitudes they adopt, what intentions they express, or what deci-
sions they make. To say "Life has a purpose even though no one thinks so
or cares about anything" will no longer make sense except as a moral expres-
sion of intention on the part of the user. But I should think a Thomist would
want very much to argue that life does have a purpose even though no one
thinks it does or makes any resolutions. The natural moral law, on a Tho-
mistic interpretation, is not a summary expression of our most pervasive and
basic decisions. If some super Communists or super Fascists did some very
thorough super brainwashing, all of us might come to believe that life has
no purpose, existence no end. We might all come to believe that we die
and rot and do what we do because in some basically arbitrary way we have
been so stimulated, but Thomists would argue that even in such a malebolge
the natural moral law would still obtain. Even if the super Communists or
super whatnots became trapped by their own propaganda and no one even
dimly understood Life's purpose, life would, in such a view, still have a pur-
pose. Such a Brave New World situation is conceivable; but even if it did
obtain, the unwritten Laws of God would remain in force: human existence
- the Thomists would say - would still have its original and distinctive
purpose, for the natural moral law is something ordained by God, not some-
thing made by man. Maritain repeatedly warns us that man is not the meas-
ure of good and evil, and man is not the measure of "the purpose of men";
rather, man dimly apprehends the natural moral law and the purpose of his
existence, and this purpose would exist even if no one thought it existed. But
if what I said above is correct, such a view cannot be true.
38. See Ronald Hepburn on "leaky redefinitions" in Ronald W. Hepburn, Literary and
Logical Analysis, 8 THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 342-57 (1958).
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Ix
I have tried to state and appraise the Thomistic theory of natural moral
law. My central criticisms of the theory occur in VI; VII and VIII are pri-
marily directed to those who may feel my last criticism in VI would not hold
if the universe has purpose or design. I have contended there is no good rea-
son to believe the universe has this purpose; and even if there were this pur-
pose, we still could not derive moral conclusions from this true statement
about our world or from observations of human behavior. But even if all this
is rejected, my other three criticisms remain.
It is perhaps natural for someone to reply to my arguments in VIII:
"Aren't you really ringing changes on what G. E. Moore called the 'natural-
istic fallacy'; aren't you really just showing that evaluations are evaluations
and descriptions are descriptions and that, as long as human discourse has
the functions it has, we cannot reduce the one to the other, though we can
point out that certain words and sentences can, and do, function both descrip-
tively and evaluatively?" And the answer to this is "Yes."
But then an interlocutor might remark: "To be clear we must accept this,
but isn't it also clear that if 'good' is to have any meaning at all - and surely
it has - it must be connected with what human beings in their rational
moments strive for, desire, or need? If good isn't what reasonable human
beings really want when they understand their place in nature and the
causes and consequences of their desires and their distinctively human quali-
ties, pray tell what is it or what can it be? If we really come to understand
'what man is for,' will we not come to understand - all subtleties about the
'is' and the 'ought' aside - what is really good and what we really ought
to do? Now isn't it the case that honest and reasonable men could claim the
contrary only in their studies?"
And once again I would want to say "yes," but I would also want to block
some very mistaken inferences from this that the Thomists make and to make
some crucial and hardheaded qualifications to this. I attempted to do this in
VI, but let me make it perfectly clear that I am not in the least suggesting
that all is dross in Aquinas. It is abundantly clear that he is one of the great
moral philosophers. Calling attention to the importance of understanding
ourselves and our place in nature in determining what we ought to do is a
permanent and useful insight of the Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition, though
I think in connecting it with the rational commands of the Deity this insight
has been badly blurred.
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If we are to gain a firm understanding of the foundations of morality,
it is necessary to explain and note the mistaken inferences and to make clear
the necessary qualifications. Three of these might be re-emphasized here:
1) "What are people for?" - though linguistically similar to "What are
chairs for?" or "What is the liver for?" - is very different from either of these
quite different questions. I have contended that there is no good reason to
believe there is a Designer. If there is no Designer, "What are people for?"
would not have an answer like "What are chairs for?" There would be no
room for the answer: "People were made for . . ." I have also argued that
there is no clear evidence from the sciences of man, presently at least, that
justifies our saying "What are people for?" has an answer like "What is the
liver for?" From a scientific point of view it has been denied that we can
speak meaningfully of "the nature of human nature."
2) Even if there is, as Sartre reminds us, human nature a posteriori but
no "essence" of man, may not man, as Nietzsche said, be something to be
surpassed; or may it not be the case, as D. H. Lawrence seems at times to
suggest, that we ought to seek to destroy or at least submerge that which is
distinctively human and firmly fix ourselves in our animal ancestry? I do not,
of course, wish to urge either of these positions, but I do wish to point out
that they are intelligible and that we cannot refute them by simply pointing
to what people want or to what is normal, assuming (as we cannot in fact)
that there are clear cross-cultural criteria for "normalcy." And it is just here
that the importance of the features centering around the "naturalistic fallacy"
becomes relevant; reflection on Moore's distinctions should make us realize
that in morals, after we weigh up all the considerations for and against some-
thing, it still must be the case that we as moral agents must decide what is
good and evil. (The force of "must" in both occurrences is logical.) The ex-
istentialists have dramatized this fact about the moral life in a very mislead-
ing way, but Ayer, Hare, and Nowell-Smith have recently made us see how
this is a logical truth about the functions of normative discourse.
3) Even if there is an anthropologically confirmed "core" to the human
animal and a notion that man has a distinct function, this would in no way
serve to establish the Thomistic theory of the natural moral law. Such "nat-
ural good" would be quite explicable on a theory like Dewey's or Fromm's,
and it is equally compatible with the kind of rational ethic articulated by
Toulmin, Nowell-Smith, and Baler. It is even compatible with Russell's or
Hume's theory. And some of these theories have the advantage of making
far fewer assumptions than does the natural moral law theory. If there is no
"core to the onion," the natural moral law theory is wrong; but if there is, it
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does not at all follow that the natural moral law theory is right or even prob-
able.
Finally, I want to make it clear that I see no good reason to say that if a
theory like Aquinas' and Maritain's is unsound the foundations of morality
totters, throwing us into the "night of subjectivity." Even if Hume, Russell,
and Ayer in their analyses of morality are right, it still does not follow that
there can be no rationality to the moral life. 39 There is no good reason at
all to say, "If there is no God, then everything is permitted." This is in itself
a moral judgment; it can be denied without self-contradiction, and there are
those who in the name of morality would deny it. In a perfectly plain sense,
some moral judgments can be justified and some objective moral appraisals
can be made.4 0 Rejection of the Thomistic ethical theory need not entail ni-
hilism, cynicism, subjectivism, or relativism. And it does not even entail that
there are no "natural moral goods." A recognition of the unsoundness of the
Thomistic natural moral theory does not make the moral life or the life of
reason impossible, but should, if correct, further it. And this should be a bles-
sing for the man who, in W. D. Falk's phrase, is committed to the principle
of nonevasive living.
39. I have tried to show how Russell's analysis does not involve these nihilistic and irra-
tional implications in my forthcoming article, Bertrand Russell's New Ethic, METHODOS.
40. This has been ably argued by STEPHEN TOULMIN, AN EXAMINATION OF THE PLACE
OF REASON IN ETHICS (Cambridge, England, 1951); and by KURT BAIER, THE MORAL
POINT OF VIEW (Ithaca, 1958). I have tried to argue for this myself in my Justification
and Moral Reasoning, 9 METHODOS 98-111 (1957) ; The Functions of Moral Discourse, 7
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 236-248 (1957); Good Reasons in Ethics, 24 THORIA 9-28
(1958); and in my forthcoming article, The Good Reasons Approach and Ontological
Justifications of Morality, to be published in THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY.
